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“The best way to accomplish the social integration 
of disabled individuals is through work.”1 
Fundación ONCE 
 
1. Introduction and Motivation 
 
One of the main purposes of this research piece is to be part of the growing scientific research on 
disability issues that tries to change the focus towards one that emphasizes the abilities of 
individuals instead of their disabilities, and one that emphasizes work incentives and labor force 
attachment instead of lack of participation. This novel approach, however, will only succeed if at 
the same time it does not forget that individuals who have some kind of condition that limits 
their ability to perform a given task or job do need some kind of protection, either financial, 
institutional or in the form of health insurance. This protection in some cases will cover very 
long periods of time and is likely to be expensive. 
 
A number of events and trends are coming together to make the study of disability programs and 
disability policies one of the most important and challenging topics in the intersection of several 
economics fields like public economics, health economics, and labor economics, and their 
interaction with related fields of study like public health, public policy, and demography. First, 
the growth of public insurance programs for people with disabilities has been tremendous in the 
last decade and a half in a number of countries, and with the rapid aging of the population around 
the world there is no clear end in sight to the expansion of these programs (See Andrews (1998), 
NRC (2001), and Lutz, Sanderson, and Scherbov (2008)). Second, the overwhelming evidence 
that the traditional incentive structures of these programs are obsolete because they focus mostly 
on the screening of individuals and clearly penalize any long-term attachment to the labor force 
after joining the rolls of the program (National Council on the Handicapped (1986), GAO (1987), 
Social Security Advisory Board (2003), and Stapleton (2004)). Third, traditional empirically-
based reduced form models of analysis of the problem are not well equipped to provide useful 
policy recommendations to policy makers and lawmakers given the myriad of complexities 
involved in understanding how changes in programs will affect individual behavior, and the 
aggregate financial viability of those programs (Tuma (2001), and Moffitt (2003)). Finally, it is 
becoming clear that analyzing these programs separately from other social insurance provisions 
can lead to flawed policy recommendations, given the clear connection and interaction between, 
for example, disability programs and retirement programs, or disability programs and 
unemployment insurance provisions. 
 
This research will try to emphasize methodologies that will overcome, hopefully in a convincing 
fashion, the third and fourth concerns in order to tackle the key issue, the second one, and at the 
end of the day provide some hope for the endeavor of tackling the really tough issue of managing 
the situation presented in the first concern. 
 
To those less familiar with disability policy, especially in countries like the United States, it is 
usually rather puzzling the trend (especially by the U.S. Social Security Administration) towards 
talking about work incentives, and the shift from the emphasis on disability to the focus on 
                                                 
1 “La mejor forma de conseguir la integración social de las personas con discapacidad es el empleo.” In the 
informative booklet Solidaridad en Acción. Fundación ONCE. 
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abilities. They are puzzled because it is usually assumed that the reason people are receiving 
benefits in the first place is because they cannot work at all. This view, common in countries 
with a simple binary definition of disability, only sees a role for the participation debate in the 
case of recovery. While recovery is certainly an interesting issue, the policy incentives even in 
that case could be delivering a low percentage of returns to the labor force among those who 
overcome their health limitations. More importantly, this view assumes, rather naïvely, that the 
government screens individuals without error, and/or that the incentive structure leads only truly 
disabled individuals to apply. Both of the latter assumptions are wrong as the work of Nagi 
(1969), Smith and Lilienfeld (1971), and more recently Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust 
(2006), has clearly shown. That research, which finds that classification errors are made, is 
essential in order to make the case that a policy of work incentives, not only directed to those 
who recover, is worth implementing. Ironically, the results of that research are also, in turn, the 
source of some of the main concerns about the reforms to the disability programs. 
 
The existence of award errors, meaning that there are some people currently receiving disability 
benefits who are not truly disabled, allows us to introduce the concept of residual work capacity, 
and discuss the potential of individuals, even those on the rolls, for actively participating as 
productive members of society.2 While this could be explained in part by recovery, the fairly 
large estimations of this error rate suggest that it goes well beyond that. It seems clear, and it is 
now widely accepted, that the pool of applicants is in part made of non-disabled individuals, and 
that the pool of awardees has a substantial proportion of individuals that can work. The estimates 
of this classification error provided by researchers are surprisingly consistent, even though they 
have used different methodologies, data, and time periods, and is around 20%. In later sections 
we will describe in more detail the methodologies used to reach this estimate. 
 
But the flipped side of the award errors are the rejection errors. The latter errors result from the 
fact that a large proportion of those who have been denied disability benefits actually deserved 
them. While the estimates of this other classification error differ a lot more in the literature, there 
is little doubt they exist, and they are important for us because they give us an assessment of the 
possible importance of what we will call induced entry effect. This measures how a possible 
change in the incentive structure of a program (in particular when it goes towards more 
generosity) has an effect on the number of people that will apply to the program. The 
government is especially interested in assessing this effect since it comes with larger 
administrative costs, and larger potential overall costs of the program, which could offset the 
possible gains from the policy reform. 
 
In this paper we will first provide the definitions, terminology, and some connected results 
(mainly the results on classification errors), which will allow us to discuss a number of policies 
to foster work among the disabled. The assessment of those policies will be discussed in some 
detail using the U.S. as a case study, with an emphasis in understanding why the methods used to 
assess them are capable of providing useful policy recommendations. I will conclude with some 
comments and an enumeration of topics of future research in the analysis of disability, social 
insurance, and labor force attachment. 
                                                 
2 In my lecture, which was in Spanish, I use the Spanish translation: “capacidad residual de trabajo.” While I do not 
claim to have coined this term, since it can be found in some related studies and discussions, there are some 
elements of originality in my presentation and use of the term. 
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Throughout the paper I will rely on my previous work with a number of co-authors. While I very 
much encourage the reader to go back to those original sources (which I will reference in detail), 
the presentation here tries to be as self-contained as possible, and at the same time original in 
terms of how the ideas are discussed and how they are connected with the main points of this 
paper. 
 
2. Some Definitions and Important Concepts 
 
A disability can have many sources and many different effects in the ability of an individual to 
function in society. While many disabling conditions have as source a serious health problem 
resulting from an illness or an accident, in many other cases they are congenital or the result of 
conditions which might not affect (at least in a dramatic fashion and in the short or medium run) 
the general health of the individual. For the purposes of this study we are interested in the 
connection between disability and the capacity for work, and therefore our analysis is inspired, as 
most work since the publication of that seminal research, by the work of Nagi (1964, 1965, 1969, 
and 1991), and the classifications by the WHO (1980).3 
 
One of the main challenges of defining disability as a condition that limits, or even prevents 
work, is that the very level of disability could be a function of the type of work and the attitudes 
of the individual towards work and life in general. For example, it is reasonable to argue that a 
few decades ago being blind would have been considered a disabling condition for someone 
wanting to work as a professor, given the demands of this type of job, but with the appearance of 
new technologies and the willingness of society to accommodate its environment to the needs of 
individuals with vision problems, that is no longer an insurmountable obstacle for the interested 
individual. This exemplifies the fact that disability is a socially evolving concept and a function 
of how society and employers accommodate the needs of individuals with certain conditions, and 
also a function of those individuals' willingness to continue their attachment to the labor force. 
 
One could envision a society so willing to invest in accommodating disabled individuals with all 
types of conditions that a large proportion of them would have the opportunity to work if they 
chose to. If that was the case, what would be the labor force participation that we should observe 
among disabled individuals? And related to that, what is the right comparison group to assess 
how far we are from that ideal? 
 
These are controversial questions, because I have observed among some researchers and interest 
groups the tendency to implicitly answer both questions with their decision to compare disabled 
individuals with the rest of the, mostly non-disabled, population. The result of that comparison is 
that given the huge gap in participation among the groups analyzed, it must be that we are light-
years away from that “ideal.” However, this comparison is very problematic for a number of 
reasons. First, it ignores the role played by the incentive structures created by the social 
insurance programs, which in general discourage work among those with a disabling condition 
serious enough to warrant receiving financial compensation and/or health insurance from some 
public or private entity. Second, it assumes, without much justification or empirical backing, that 
                                                 
3 Recent discussions of the definition of disability can be found in Wunderlich et al. (2002), Social Security 
Advisory Board (2003), Burkhauser et al. (2003), and Stapleton (2004). 
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the reasons that encourage or discourage participation in the labor force among the disabled and 
the non-disabled are the same. Third, it ignores the fact that the proportion of conditions and 
individuals affected by those conditions, which are so serious that no reasonable accommodation 
could allow that person to work, might be non-trivial. Fourth, it tends to interpret the gap solely 
as the product of the lack of accommodations by employers and society, and also of 
discrimination. 
 
The problem is that it is a tall order to identify the likely effects of the three caveats I have 
enumerated, and it tends to put too much weight on the fourth residual interpretation. It is unclear, 
however, how to come up with an adjustment to the labor force participation figures that would 
allow us to either set an ideal or assess how far we are from it. Fortunately, it seems quite clear 
that there is a long way to go in terms of accommodations and social support for those with 
disabling conditions, so that we should be less worried, at least for now, about the ultimate and 
elusive objective, and more worried about moving in the right direction.4 
 
One clear direction is towards setting up social insurance programs which do not discourage 
work among those with disabilities, which allow for an easy transition from work to disability 
and back, and that focus on the abilities of individuals and not their disabilities. In most countries, 
however, these objectives are at odds with the current incentive structures, forcing us to think 
about reforms as a first logical step towards that promised land of providing everyone, regardless 
of their disability status, the possibility of participating in the productive process. 
 
The reason why we want to think about reforms is because we believe four things, and have 
hopes about a fifth one: (1) That not all disabling conditions completely prevent individuals from 
work; (2) That many disabled individuals, if given the right incentives and working conditions, 
would like to participate in the labor force; (3) That the cost of accommodations are likely to be 
more than compensated financially and in welfare terms by the potential contribution of the 
disabled to the economy, and (4) that discrimination plays a small role in explaining the low 
levels of participation among the disabled. 
 
While assessing (3) and (4) will remain outside of the scope of this analysis, but hopefully not of 
future research, some approximate quantification of the role of (1) and (2) can be inferred from 
the assertion that even among those receiving benefits there are individuals with residual work 
capacity. This residual work capacity will be in fact quantified in connection with the existence 
of individuals who self-report not having a health limitation that prevents them from work while 
on the rolls of a disability insurance program. This inference is especially appealing in countries, 
like the United States, where the Social Security definition of disability is binary, meaning that it 
is an all or nothing decision by the government on the application for benefits. Clearly disability 
is better defined as continuous, covering a wide spectrum of possible attachments to the labor 
force. In a binary model it all comes down to where the threshold lies after implementing the 
screening process, and that threshold is endogenous to the incentive structure. 
 
                                                 
4 I do not claim that discrimination does not exist, that would be naïve and insensitive, but instead that without 
understanding all the causes of the lack of participation, any estimates of the importance of discrimination are likely 
to be grossly upward biased. 
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The hopes are over a fifth issue, and that is the size of the induced entry effect of policy reforms. 
If the induced entry effect is very large, any policy to foster work among the disabled will likely 
be too expensive to be considered seriously by the government. A simple approximation to the 
likely importance of this effect is the size of the rejection error in the system, that is, the backlog 
of individuals who were rejected but are, at least in theory, ready to jump back in if the system 
becomes more generous. 
 
From this discussion it is clear that we need to assess the size of the classification errors present 
in the award process in disability programs. We discuss this issue in the next section. 
 
3. The U.S. Disability System: Description and Classification errors 
 
In this section we will concentrate on the U.S. Disability system, but the assessment of the 
classification errors of any targeted social insurance system should be an objective in every 
country that offers this type of programs.5 
 
There are two major publicly provided long-term disability programs in the United States, the 
Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) and the Supplemental Security Income (SSI). While 
the two programs share one system to decide who will receive benefits, the eligibility criteria are 
quite different, since SSI is means tested, and it is not considered Social Security, which allows 
beneficiaries to receive it at the same time as SSDI. In this study we will concentrate on SSDI, 
but many of the lessons we will extract from the analysis will also speak to the future of SSI. We 
refer the reader to the work of Stapleton et al. (1994), Lahiri et al. (1995), Benítez-Silva et al. 
(1999), Bound and Berkhauser (1999), and Haveman and Wolfe (2000) for a careful description 
and analysis of these programs. 
 
The Social Security Disability Insurance (SSDI) program paid benefits to over 9.5 million 
Americans during 2006, at a cost of 92 billion dollars. These individuals have some type of 
severe health problem that, according to the government, is likely to last more than 12 months or 
result in death, and that prevents them from engaging in any substantial gainful activity (SGA).6 
The SSDI provides them with earnings of more than $970 a month.7 This program has work 
requirements and individuals need to have worked for 5 years out of the last 10 in order to 
qualify. There is no minimum age to receive the benefits, and when individuals reach the Normal 
Retirement Age it converts to Old Age Benefits. Individuals are eligible for Medicare two years 
after joining the program. The growth in the program in the last decade and a half has been 
impressive. For example, in 1990 there were only 4.9 million beneficiaries, and the SSA 
forecasts that the number of beneficiaries will increase by around 37% by 2012. 
 
                                                 
5 Jiménez-Martín, Labeaga, and Vilaplana (2006) quantify the award errors in the Spanish system and find them to 
be much larger than in the U.S. For a description of the Spanish disability system and its current challenges related 
to work and long-term care, see Muñoz Machado et al. (1997), Sánchez (2004), Alba and Moreno (2004), Malo 
(2004), and Guillén (2007). For a recent description of the pension system in Spain see Molinas (2008). 
6 The SGA for nonblind persons is $900 a month, and it is $1,500 a month for the blind. 
7 As of December of 2006, 7.8 million individuals received SSDI benefits as disabled workers, spouses of disabled 
workers, or children of disabled workers. Of the total, 87% were disabled workers. Over 80% of the impairments 
among disabled workers were composed of mental disorders, problems of the nervous system, problems of the 
musculoskeletal system and connective tissue, endocrine diseases, and problems of the circulatory system. 
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SSI is a means-tested cash assistance program enacted in 1974. Unlike SSDI, there is no work 
requirement for SSI benefits. However, SSI applications are evaluated according to the same 
process as DI benefits and satisfy the same basic definition of disability. During 2006 SSI paid 
benefits to 4.1 million individuals of ages 18 to 64, at a cost of 38 billions dollars. In 1990 the 
number of beneficiaries was 2.45 million. The SSI has very low asset threshold of only $2,000 
for a single individual. In terms of earnings threshold, for OASDI recipients all benefits above a 
$20 disregard are subtracted from their SSI benefit level, and for those receiving labor earnings 
the disregard is $85 a month. This low earnings disregards result in the average SSI recipient 
receiving considerably less than the federal SSI benefit rate of $623 a month. As a result of 
different eligibility requirements, the SSI program serves a different "clientele" than does the 
SSDI program: 57% of disabled adults under 65 receiving SSI benefits are women, whereas 52% 
of adult SSDI beneficiaries are male. In contrast to SSDI, SSI recipients are not subject to a five-
month waiting period to receive benefits, and are immediately eligible for Medicaid benefits. 
However, monthly SSI benefits are significantly lower, averaging only $455 per month in 2006. 
Notice, however, that as of December of 2006, over 1.2 million Americans were receiving both 
OASDI Disability benefits and SSI, indicating that a non-trivial proportion of DI recipients have 
a history of earnings which provide for a fairly low DI benefit, and current assets level which 
allows them to receive SSI. 
 
The quantification of the classification errors in the disability system was pioneered by the 
ground work of Nagi (1964), which resulted in the seminal study in Nagi (1969). Nagi presented 
an independent external audit of a sample of 2,454 DI cases. Teams of five experts (consisting of 
a physician, a psychologist, a social worker, an occupational therapist, and a vocational 
counselor) conducted individual home examinations/interviews for their sample of DI applicants. 
With the assistance of a moderator, the team arrived at a collective decision about the disability 
status of the applicant, without knowledge of the SSA's actual award decision. The results are 
that the implied rejection error rate, 48%, was almost three times as large as the award error rate, 
19%. The team of experts was slightly more lenient than SSA, concluding that 68% of applicants 
were disabled compared to the SSA's award rate of 62%. However, this difference is not large 
enough to explain the surprising number of classification errors. Overall, the expert team's 
decisions differed from SSA's award decision in over 30% of the cases considered. 
 
Smith and Lilienfeld (1971) reported the results of an internal audit of DI awards done by the 
SSA's own Bureau of Disability Insurance (BDI). The BDI found that 21.2% of DI awards 
should have been denied and 22.5% of DI denials should have been awarded. However, the 
objectivity of SSA's “self-audits” may be open to question. 
 
It was not until recently that another audit (in this case external) of the system has been 
conducted, this time using household level data, by Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006). 
The authors' approach for estimating the classification errors in the SSA disability award process 
is simple: they compare the SSA's award decisions to the self-reported disability status of a 
sample of applicants who, they argue, have provided truthful and accurate reports of their 
disability status. The authors study a subset of individuals from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS) who applied for DI or SSI benefits between 1992 and 1996. They compare the SSA's 
ultimate award decision a (i.e., after allowing for the possibility of appeal) to the individual's 
self-reported disability status d (recorded at the closest HRS interview to the time of application). 
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The latter is a binary indicator that is set to 1 if the HRS respondent reports that they have an 
“impairment or health condition that prevents them from working entirely,” and 0 otherwise. 
This is essentially the same as the SSA's definition of disability as an “inability to engage in 
substantial gainful activity.” Although there are semantic differences between the SSA's 
definition of “disability” and the definition implicit in the use of the self-reported disability 
question in the HRS interviews, it is reasonable to believe that the definitional differences are of 
second order relative to the potentially more serious concern that DI or SSI applicants have an 
incentive to misreport (i.e., exaggerate) the severity of their impairments and to claim that they 
are incapable of working even when they really can work. 
 
Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2006) estimate as follows the classification error rates, 
building  upon some of their previous results that showed that the self-reported measure and the 
government decision are unbiased but noisy measures of each other (Benítez-Silva et al. (2004)). 
They argue that in addition to an individual's self-reported disability status d and SSA's ultimate 
award decision a, assume there exists a third, latent indicator of “true disability status,” τ. 
Consider first the case where d = τ (i.e., where d is treated as representing the measure of “true 
disability”). Using observations on the SSA's ultimate award decision a and the self-reported 
disability d for the sample of applicants from the HRS, the authors can estimate the joint 
distribution, Prob {a,d}. The estimated classification error rates can be computed as conditional 
probability statements using this joint distribution. There are two types of classification errors: 
award errors and rejection errors. The former is the conditional probability that a person who 
has been awarded benefits is not truly disabled, i.e., Prob {d=0 | a=1}. The latter error is the 
conditional probability that an applicant who was denied benefits is truly disabled, i.e., Prob 
{d=1 | a=0}. The authors estimate the award error to be 22% and the rejection error to be 58%.8 
 
It is possible to estimate the award and rejection error rates without assuming that d = τ, in the 
more realistic case where a and d are both noisy indicators of the latent indicator of true 
disability, τ. Based again on the results from Benítez-Silva et al. (2004), the authors argue that 
both a and d are unbiased indicators of true disability status τ. Under the additional assumption 
that the three binary random variables τ, d, and a form a trivariate probit system with a 
correlation structure that matches the correlation between the observed random variables a and d, 
they can derive formulae for the classification error probabilities by a straightforward application 
of Bayes Rule. The Bayes estimates of the award error rate is 21.7%, and the rejection error rate 
is 59.9%, which hardly differ from the award and rejection errors, 21.9% and 58.6% respectively, 
obtained in the case where it is assumed that d = τ with probability 1. 
 
The Bayes estimates are based on an “equicorrelation assumption” which implies that a and d are 
equally accurate signals of true disability status τ. However, in order to assess the robustness of 
those conclusions, the authors also compute classification error rates under the assumption that 
unobservable factors that affect the Social Security award decision a are much more strongly 
correlated with the unobservable factors affecting true disability status τ, than are the 
                                                 
8 The award and rejection errors are different from the usual Type I and Type II errors of hypothesis testing. A Type 
I error rate is the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis that an applicant is “truly disabled”, when it is true, i.e., 
Prob {a=0 | τ=1}, while Type II error rate is the probability of not rejecting the null hypothesis when it is false, i.e., 
Prob {a=1| τ =0}. Our point estimates of the Type I and II error rates of the SSA award process are 22% and 62%, 
respectively. 
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unobservable factors affecting individuals' self-reported disability status d.  This implies that the 
Social Security award decision a is a significantly more accurate signal of true disability than is 
an individual's self-report d. However, even in this case the classification error rates are 
substantial, and even in the “best case” (for SSA) results, the award error rate is 16% and the 
rejection error rate is 52%. 
 
From these three studies that have audited the U.S. Social Security Disability system we can 
conclude that errors are made, that the award error is probably around 20%, and that the rejection 
error is probably close to 50%. This means that there are individuals with residual work capacity, 
which give us hope for bringing some of them back into the labor market, but also means that the 
possible induced entry effects of future reforms to the system should be carefully assessed, since 
the number of individuals who could be ready to apply again, especially if the system is 
perceived as more generous, might not be trivial. 
 
4. Disability Insurance and Work Incentives: Present and Future of Policy 
Reforms 
 
In the last few years the Social Security Administration (SSA) has considered a number of policy 
changes with the objective of fostering work among SSDI recipients. This has become an 
important priority in the government's agenda regarding disability policy. For example, Jo Anne 
B. Barnhart, former Commissioner of the SSA, stated in 2003 that expanding the employment 
opportunities for people with disabilities was one of the main objectives of her administration.9 
Furthermore, in the Social Security 2003—2008 strategic plan, she also set as an objective to 
have an increase of 50% in the number of people with disabilities who achieve employment, by 
2008 relative to the 2001 levels. 
 
The system has provided some work incentives for some time. For example, disabled 
beneficiaries are encouraged to return to work by providing a trial work period (TWP), and an 
extended period of eligibility (EPE). During the TWP, earnings are allowed to exceed the 
Substantial Gainful Activity (SGA) dollar amount for 9 months. During the 3-year EPE that 
follows the TWP, benefits are withheld only for those months in which earnings exceed the SGA 
amount. After the end of the EPE, monthly benefits are terminated when earnings exceed the 
SGA amount. Certain impairment related expenses that a person needs to make in order to work 
may be deducted when counting earnings to determine whether the work is substantial. Even if 
cash benefits are withheld, Medicare and Medicaid coverage can continue.10 
 
More recently a number of additional initiatives have started to be implemented, and some are in 
the pipeline of the policy makers. Five of them are already in place in some degree, and we will 
discuss in more detail the two other initiatives that might be implemented in the future. 
 
First, the SSA has put in place the Ticket to Work program, which allows SSDI recipients to 
obtain free vocational counseling from thousands of different agencies located around the U.S. to 
help them return to work. The agency is paid “prospectively,” that is, for every year a DI 
                                                 
9 Stated in her address before the House Committee on Ways and Means Social Security Subcommittee, in 
September of 2003. 
10 Muller (1992, 2000) indicates that only about 11% of new DI awardees eventually take advantage of the TWP. 
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beneficiary stays off the rolls due to the vocational training and rehabilitation services it had 
provided up front. The agency receives 40% of the DI benefit the person would have been paid if 
they had stayed on the rolls. This initiative received a lot of support from researchers in the mid 
1990s when the caseloads where increasing sharply while the rehabilitations and terminations 
had fallen to all time lows (see for example, Berkowitz (1996)). While the Ticket to Work Act 
seems like a highly innovative program, it is questionable as to whether it will represent a cost-
effective use of government funds, and whether it will help a significant number of DI 
beneficiaries return to work. Since the policy is already implemented, the only alternative for 
researchers is to do “ex post” evaluations. These evaluations, so far, seem to show very poor 
results of this initiative (see for example Thornton (2007), and Capella-McDonnall (2007)). 
 
The second initiative is the Expanded Availability of Health Care Services, which as of October 
1, 2000, expands Medicaid and Medicare coverage to more people with disabilities who work. It 
extends Medicare Part A premium-free coverage for 93 months after the trial work period for 
most disabled beneficiaries who work. In addition, States now have the option to expand 
Medicaid coverage to workers with disabilities using income and resource limits set by the States. 
 
The third initiative is the possibility of obtaining Expedited Benefits. Effective January 1, 2001, 
if a person's Social Security or SSI disability benefits have ended because of earnings from work, 
and if he or she becomes unable to work again within 60 months because of his or her medical 
condition the person would be able to request reinstatement of benefits, including Medicare and 
Medicaid, without filing a new application. 
 
The fourth initiative is called the Disability Reviews Postponed. Effective January 1, 2001, an 
individual using a “ticket” does not need to undergo the regularly scheduled disability reviews. 
Effective January 1, 2002, people who have been receiving Social Security disability benefits for 
at least 24 months will not be asked to go through a disability review because of the work they 
are doing. However, regularly scheduled medical reviews could still be performed and benefits 
could be terminated if earnings were above the limits. 
 
The fifth initiative is the Work Incentives Outreach Program. The law directs the Social Security 
Administration to establish a community-based work incentives planning and assistance program 
to disseminate accurate information about work incentives and to give beneficiaries more choice. 
SSA has established a program of cooperative agreements and contracts to provide benefits 
planning and assistance to all disabled beneficiaries, including information about the availability 
of protection and advocacy services. 
 
It is still early to assess the ultimate effect of all these policies, but with the current hard numbers 
in hand the effect on Social Security terminations due to return to work above the SGA level 
have actually declined in percentage of initial beneficiaries from 2001 to 2006. Clearly this is 
disappointing, and seems to indicate that the piece-meal approach to reform is unlikely to lead to 
the kind of change needed for work to start playing a real role in the lives of millions of 
disability recipients. Precisely because of this, both among researchers and internally at SSA, 
there is the sense that more radical reforms are necessary. 
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We are going to discuss two such reforms to the system that could have a larger effect on the 
relationship between benefits and work. None of them has a deadline for implementation, but 
they are either under serious consideration or under preliminary study. One is what is termed 
internally as the “$1 for $2 Benefit Offset.” This policy has not yet been enacted, but former 
Commissioner Barnhart herself told Congress that “Ongoing Employment Supports to assist 
beneficiaries to obtain and sustain employment will be tested, including a Benefit Offset 
demonstration to test to effects of allowing DI beneficiaries to work without total loss of benefits 
by reducing their monthly benefit $1 for every $2 of earnings above a specified level.” The 
analysis of this first alternative policy has been performed by Benítez-Silva, Buchinksy, and Rust 
(2008), and we will summarize their approach and findings. The second policy is the possibility 
of implementing a partial disability benefits system in the U.S., similar to what is already in 
place in countries like Spain, Germany, Sweden, or the Netherlands. This has been recently 
analyzed by Yin (2008), and we will briefly describe her set up and findings here. We will then 
finish this section discussing the intrinsic differences between these policies, arguing that they 
are actually complementary and that the U.S. should consider their implementation as a bundle 
which would have a deep and long lasting effect on the relationship between work and benefits, 
which is currently clearly biased toward work disincentives. 
 
Before giving more details about the results of the two studies that use dynamic models to 
analyze the effects of policy reform, it is worth discussing why it is necessary to resort to the 
complexities of a full dynamic structural model to disentangle the effects at play. First, it is clear 
that the individuals who would be facing these new incentives are making inter-temporal 
decisions under uncertainty, and are taking into account the existence and details of all social 
insurance programs for which they might be eligible.11 Second, given that the policy is new and 
has not been implemented on this population before, no other methodology is better equipped to 
assess the effects of this reform. Dynamic structural models provide a quasi-experimental setting 
in which we can keep constant the rest of the environment in order to isolate the effect of 
changes in incentives. However, this methodology comes with a cost; namely, that we need to 
make a host of assumptions in order to solve and simulate these kinds of models, where some of 
these assumptions are hard to justify except for tractability and the need to set up the model with 
the objective of matching the data. 
 
The best way to understand these models is to think about their different pieces, and how they 
come together to provide the policy recommendations that can help policy makers and 
lawmakers when making their decisions. Economic models can be described as having three 
connected pieces used to reflect the reality as close as possible. The first piece corresponds to the 
particular parameterization of preferences we will assume individuals have over consumption, 
leisure, health, or other variables considered to belong in the utility functions of individuals. 
Preferences also include a discount factor or a discount function that assesses the weight that 
future utility has with respect to current utility. Preference characterizations are ad-hoc, and the 
particular parameterizations hard to defend beyond their tractability and their mathematical 
properties that can sometimes be linked to certain behaviors which we believe reflect reality. In 
principle preferences could be easily changed to match just about any observable behavior, 
leading to the debate over the lack of non-parametric identification of dynamic models (see Rust 
                                                 
11 See Benítez-Silva, Demiralp, and Liu (2008) for a recent discussion of what people know about Social Security 
rules in the United States using survey data, and the cost of their lack of knowledge of the details of the system. 
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(1994), Taber (2000), and Magnac and Thesmar (2002)). This lack of identification is not very 
satisfying, which leads most researchers to use very similar characterizations of preferences 
using functions, the properties of which are well understood and studied, and then providing in 
some cases a study of how sensitive their results are to the particular preference assumptions. 
Researchers then claim identification of the model within the parametric family chosen, and hope 
to find the best model within the constraints of the chosen parametric model. 
 
The second key element, are the beliefs agents have about the future states of the world, and 
about how current states will evolve towards those states. Many models assume perfect foresight, 
such that uncertainty does not play any role, but the trend is towards allowing different sources 
of uncertainty in dynamic models, using empirical distributions and stochastic processes to 
reflect the likely beliefs of individuals over future states of the world. While researchers also 
have considerable freedom in how they set up this part of the model, in general empirical data 
constrain how they are characterized, and it is easier to check whether the characterization is 
appropriate for the problem at hand. Modeling health uncertainties, wage uncertainties, interest 
rate uncertainties, mortality uncertainties, unemployment uncertainties, uncertainties over future 
government policies, and so on, are becoming commonplace among researchers dealing with 
these types of models.12 
 
The third and final component, are the incentive structures set up to reflect the actual constraints 
faced by real decision makers. Theoretically this is simple: just take into account the constraints 
we know individuals face, and the laws specified in each case about the issue of study and 
include them in the model. However, in reality this can be quite complex since it requires 
keeping track of the large amount of information used by public and private entities to compute 
present and future benefits or future and present entitlements of all kinds.13 These complex 
incentive structures result in complications of the models and the need for simplifications in 
order to avoid the curse of dimensionality which results in the lack of tractability of many 
models that conceptually are simple but become too large very quickly. 
 
The key of using dynamic models for the analysis of policy reforms is to isolate the effects of the 
changes to the incentive structure that individuals face, keeping their preference and beliefs 
constant. This provides useful and reliable results, assuming that the benchmark models provide 
a good characterization of reality. The results should in general be robust to different 
characterizations of preferences and beliefs, assuming those are such that they come close to 
replicating reality. Ideally, the benchmark models will be estimated and pass a rigorous test of 
the quality of their approximation to reality, but in many cases they are either too complex to 
estimate or data limitations prevents us from devising a full-fleshed estimation of the model, at 
least in the time frames required to provide timely policy recommendations.14 
 
                                                 
12 Benítez-Silva et al. (2007) analyze the consequences of accounting for future benefits uncertainties on the 
retirement behavior of older Americans. 
13 For examples of how important it is to model incentives properly, in that case in the retirement system, see 
Benitez-Silva and Heiland (2007, and 2008). 
14 Rust and Phelan (1997), French (2005), and van der Klaauw and Wolpin (2005) estimate retirement models, and 
Blau (2008) solves and simulates a similar model focusing on consumption choices. Todd and Wolpin (2003) show 
the out-of-sample performance of a dynamic model of schooling and fertility using Mexican data. 
 13
I believe, and I do not think (hope) I am alone, that economists should first put most of their 
efforts in characterizing as closely as possible to reality the incentive structure. After all, our 
social science is one of incentives, and it is the only piece connected with policy, since 
preferences are in general considered to be very hard (if at all possible) to change, and beliefs 
very slow to evolve and equally hard to modify through economic policy. While it is especially 
tempting (and many fall into that temptation rather easily) to use preference heterogeneity to 
explain behavior, it is less desirable than being able to account for it through the appropriate 
incentives, or even empirically grounded homogeneous beliefs about future events affecting 
economic constraints. 
 
4.1. The $1 for $2 Offset in the SSDI system 
 
Under the $1 for $2 benefit offset, a SSDI recipient who earns more than the SGA after the TWP 
would not be terminated from the rolls. Instead their DI benefits would be reduced by $1 for 
every $2 earned above the SGA disregard. In simple terms, the $1 for $2 amounts to replacing 
the current 100% forfeiture of benefits due to earnings in excess of SGA, with a 50% surtax. 
 
Clearly, the $1 for $2 offset would increase the overall level of generosity of the SSDI program. 
This is particularly clear for those who have fully or partially recovered and who would like to 
return to work in order to supplement their SSDI benefits. While it seems likely that the $1 for 
$2 offset would increase the amount of labor supplied to the market by some SSDI recipients, it 
is less clear whether or not it leads to cost savings from permanent induced exit from SSDI. In 
fact the $1 for $2 offset might make it more comfortable for SSDI recipients to remain on the 
rolls longer. In turn it could lead to a decrease in the number of beneficiaries who exit SSDI after 
the trial work period. Hoynes and Moffitt (1996) briefly touch on this policy reform within a 
simple static model, and emphasize the likely increase in caseloads but the ambiguous effect on 
work and total benefits paid. 
 
Perhaps the biggest concern to policy makers is the possibility that the increased generosity of 
SSDI under the $1 for $2 offset would result in significant induced entry by individuals who are 
not yet on SSDI, but who could be induced, on the margin, to apply under the new policy. After 
all, in the previous sections we have argued that the large rejection error rates of the system 
imply that there is a substantial pool of individuals who could apply again for the program, 
especially if it becomes more generous. Previous studies by the SSA and the Congressional 
Budget Office (CBO) provide very different forecasts of the magnitude of the induced entry 
effect. The CBO (1997) estimates that the $1 for $2 offset would result in an increase of 75,000 
SSDI beneficiaries over a ten-year period, whereas the SSA estimates that it would increase 
SSDI rolls by 400,000 over the same time period. Consequently, the CBO predicts that over the 
first five years the net costs will increase by $410 million, while the SSA predicts that costs will 
increase by $5.1 billion. The model described here predicts an induced entry effect that lies 
between these two projections. 
 
The $1 for $2 offset has already been implemented for the Supplemental Security Income (SSI) 
program, but with a lower disregard of $85 per month. However, since there are strict 
asset/income tests imposed on the SSI applicants, the induced entry effect is likely to be much 
smaller than it would be for the SSDI applicants. A study by Muller, Scott, and Bye (1996) 
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concluded that the changes in labor force participation or earnings are negligible. In contrast, 
Neumark and Powers (2003) find significant labor supply disincentives due to state level 
supplements to the SSI benefits. These benefits appear large enough to completely swamp the 
effect on work incentives of the $1 for $2 proposal. The idea of extending the $1 for $2 offset to 
the SSDI program is extremely popular with disability advocates. They claim that the threat of 
loss of benefits due to earnings in excess of the SGA after the TWP is the primary reason why 
those SSDI beneficiaries who are able to return to work, do not do so. 
 
In 1999 President Clinton signed a Federal law mandating that the Social Security 
Administration undertake a “demonstration project” (i.e., a controlled randomized experiment), 
to estimate the magnitude of labor supply response and the level of induced entry that would 
likely occur under the $1 for $2 offset. However, there is a lot of skepticism about the usefulness 
of such an approach. A panel of consultants chosen by the SSA to evaluate the proposed 
experiment concluded that classical experimental designs should not be used to study induced 
entry. Instead they recommended to rely on the insights of dynamic models of individual 
behavior and responses to hypothetical surveys (Tuma, 2001, p. v). 
 
Benítez-Silva, Buchinsky, and Rust (2008) provide a detailed examination of the induced entry 
effect and other effects, using such a dynamic approach to provide predictions of the effects of 
the $1 for $2 offset proposal. The authors use a calibrated version of the life cycle model to 
examine the behavioral responses to the proposed $1 for $2 benefit offset plan. The model 
incorporates a realistic treatment of the SSA rules, particularly regarding the SSDI program. The 
model was calibrated by fitting the simulated data of a population of life-cycle optimizers to that 
of a sample of individuals born between 1931 and 1941, from the Health and Retirement Study 
(HRS), and their spouses. While this life-cycle model makes some simplifying assumptions, it 
provides a convincing illustration of the potential value of it, in general, and specifically for 
evaluating the effects of the $1 for $2 offset policy. 
 
The model predicts that the $1 for $2 offset provides a very effective labor supply incentive. 
Under the baseline simulations—referred to as the status quo—which replicate the current policy 
environment, the authors find that about 9.5% of the SSDI recipients eventually return to work. 
In sharp contrast, under the $1 for $2 offset, 48.9% of the SSDI recipients eventually return to 
work at some point during their spells on SSDI. However, almost all of these individuals return 
to work only on a part-time basis and for a relatively short duration. The average number of 
years worked, while receiving SSDI benefits, is about 2.9 years. The mean earnings of those who 
return to work is $9,096 annually, significantly higher than the SGA for this cohort, namely 
$6,000 annually. The model incorporates health dynamics and it predicts that 75% of the 
individuals on the DI rolls will eventually experience some partial recovery, while 50% will fully 
recover. This implies that under the $1 for $2 offset, almost all of the fully recovered 
beneficiaries have sufficient incentives to return to work, whereas only 18% have sufficient 
incentives under the status quo. 
 
An important reason for these large labor supply responses is that it is explicitly assumed that the 
SSA is able to make a credible commitment not to increase the audit rates— known internally at 
SSA as “continuing disability reviews” (CDRs)—for DI recipients who return to work. Under 
the status quo, engaging in the TWP leads to greater risk of being terminated from the DI rolls 
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due to the audits. This is why only 10% of DI recipients take advantage of the TWP. If the 
authors assume that individuals continue to have these beliefs under the $1 for $2 offset, then the 
fraction of DI recipients who ultimately return to work falls from 48.9% to 36.8%. 
 
Most importantly, the model predicts that the $1 for $2 offset will not have a very significant 
induced entry effect. The model predicts an increase of only 2.2% in the number of SSDI 
applications while SSDI rolls increase by 3.2%. However, the mean duration of a beneficiary on 
the program increases only slightly, from 12.7 to 13.0 years. Thus, the induced entry effect is 
primarily responsible for the 5.9% increase in the total number of person-years spent on SSDI. 
The present value of benefit payments (discounted to age 21 at a 2% interest rate per year), 
increases by only 1.7%, from $115,000 per beneficiary to $117,000 per beneficiary. However, 
since there are more DI beneficiaries, due to induced entry, the total discounted value of SSDI 
benefit payments is predicted to increase by 4.9%. While the present value of Social Security 
contributions increases by 4.2% under the $1 for $2 offset, the net discounted cost of the SSDI 
program still increases by 5%. 
 
In summary, the results indicate that the $1 for $2 offset provides a substantial benefit to a subset 
of SSDI recipients, allowing them to achieve higher income, consumption, and wealth 
accumulation during, and following, their spells on SSDI. In particular, annual consumption for 
these individuals increases by an average of 2.2% over their full lifetimes, and by 6.9% between 
the ages of 45 and 65. Nevertheless, the program is not generous enough to induce entry of 
younger individuals, because the “ex ante” increase in welfare for a younger person who has not 
yet experienced a disabling condition is small. The main welfare gains of the $1 for $2 occur “ex 




4.2. A Partial Benefits SSDI system 
 
As discussed in Aarts and de Jong (1996) the partial benefits options has been in place for some 
time in many European countries. However, in the U.S. even though there have been several 
occasions in which influential Think Tanks have mentioned the need to analyze this possibility, 
there has not been an analysis of this reform until the recent work by Yin (2008). In fact, in a 
report prepared by the Social Security Advisory Board (2006), their suggestions for long-term 
disability program enhancements include considering a partial disability program, they state 
“One concept that has been brought to our attention is that of establishing eligibility criteria for 
partial disability.” In an earlier report (2003), one of the alternative program changes they 
suggest is “changing the current all-or-nothing concept of disability eligibility to a program 
providing percentages of disability based (at least for less than 100 percent levels) on very 
specific medically determinable criteria.” 
 
Yin builds upon the work of Benítez-Silva, Buchinksy, and Rust (2008) to solve and simulate a 
model that allows individuals to freely choose between four different levels of disability benefits, 
each of them with a different acceptable earnings maximum, where the highest level of disability 
(full benefits) is the same as in the current system, and the lower levels allow individuals to 
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receive 75%, 50%, and 25% of the full benefit while working and earning more than the SGA in 
the current system, in some cases substantially more. 
 
A partial Disability Insurance system amounts to essentially changing the current DI system 
from one that awards benefits only to those fully disabled (with health limitations that prevent 
them from working completely) to one that awards also partial benefits to those partially disabled 
(whose health limitations interfere with their work but not prevent them from working 
completely) and are employing their residual work capacities in the labor force, and changing the 
Social Security definition of disability from a binary disability definition to a relatively 
continuous disability concept. The partial DI system encourages working and leaving the rolls by 
hoping that potentially higher benefits recipients will apply for lower benefits if they feel capable 
of working and earning more than the limit for the higher benefits. In that sense, it works in a 
similar way to the Trial Work Period (TWP) in the current DI system, but is expected to be more 
effective fostering a continuous attachment to the labor force among the disabled, compared to 
the very limited time provided in the TWP. 
 
However, the main concern with this reform is, again, the induced entry effect that it could have, 
since it is unambiguously more generous than the current system. It is key therefore to set up the 
problem again within the dynamic structural framework that provides a quasi-experimental 
setting to study the effects of this reform. 
 
Yin (2008) finds that the model predicts substantial increases in DI applications and number of 
individuals on the rolls when changing from status quo to a partial DI system.  However, most of 
the increases are due to applications for partial benefits and awards to partial benefits. In fact, she 
finds a significant decrease in applications for full DI benefits, and a considerable drop in full DI 
benefit rolls. The mean duration spent on DI decreases substantially. This is likely due to the 
continuous attachment to the labor force under the partial DI system, which makes DI recipients 
go back to the labor force more easily and allows workers to apply for DI while still working. 
Her budgetary and welfare calculations show that a partial DI system, under some conditions, 
could result in financial savings for the government as well as clear welfare improvements for 
individuals. 
 
4.3. No Need to Choose or Why not Have the Best of Both Worlds 
 
The partial benefits system overcomes some of the more problematic aspects of the $1 for $2 
offset proposal; namely, that it focuses on the current disability recipients and maintains a 
possibly inconsistent DI system where in order to get into the program you have to be fully 
disabled, but as soon as you are in the program, it is accepted that your disability is only partial. 
While this policy works well in order to accommodate health improvements, it clearly opens the 
door for more strategic behavior. The partial system does not focus on those currently receiving 
but on the incentives set up for those who will apply in the future, thinking about managing the 
impending growth in the system. It is an “ex-ante” intervention on the system, instead of the “ex-
post” represented by the offset policy. 
 
On the other hand, it should be taken into account that the partial system is likely to be much 
more costly in administrative terms given the large predicted increase in the caseloads. More 
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importantly, given the large number of individuals currently on the rolls it is unclear whether it is 
enough to only focus on managing the future caseloads, but it becomes necessary to attack the 
problem from every angle. This means that these two policies are complementary and could be 
considered to be implemented at once. While one could be worried about the large induced entry 
effect of implementing two more generous policies at the same time, the truth is that some of the 
induced entry effect of the offset policy would be reduced by the implementation of the partial 
benefit system, since it is unlikely that individuals who want to maintain an attachment to the 
labor force would first drop completely, just to go back when they get full benefits. 
 
The analysis of the consequences of these policy changes is likely to underestimate the final 
(positive) effect on the system since the models are set up in partial equilibrium. This means that 
they cannot account for the effects of changing the current social perception that disability and 
work are almost incompatible. The early intervention philosophy, which can prevent many 
individuals from dropping from the labor force to start with, can have a large and long-lasting 
effect in society and the pool of potential applicants. Also, implementing both reforms it is 
almost equivalent to allowing individuals to choose their disability level in a continuum, which 
maximizes the possibility of extracting the maximum residual work capacity from those 
individuals willing to work. 
 
5. Comments and Conclusions 
 
Many readers will likely be left with the feeling that we have only scratched the surface of the 
analysis of what is necessary to make a large proportion of disabled individuals become 
participants in the labor force. We have said nothing about how to get employers to invest in 
accommodations—sometimes through new technology—and hire more disabled individuals, 
how to change the social perceptions regarding the possible contributions of individuals with 
disabilities to the productivity of the private and public sector, or about the fact that the passing 
of laws protecting those with disabilities seems to have had, in many countries, a negative effect 
in the total number of disabled individuals who are employed. We have also been silent about 
how to compute the increased administrative costs to the system of implementing some of the 
more radical policy changes, and about alternative possible reforms to systems with some of 
these policies already in place. We have also ignored the possible participation of the private 
sector in providing and/or administering some type of disability insurance. All these issues are 
interesting and challenging areas of future research, and come to show the very modest 
objectives of this research piece. 
 
We have first tried to make the case for a careful approach to interpreting the currently low labor 
force participation rates of individuals with disabilities, given the many reasons behind it, chiefly 
among them the very incentive structure that may lead those individuals to choose between 
benefits and work. We have also made the case for the existence of considerable residual work 
capacity even among those who are currently receiving full DI benefits, and for the need to 
account for potentially large induced entry effects into disability programs if the generosity of 
the system is affected by reforms. We have then discussed the need for additional reforms to the 
systems in order to change a system that has for too long sent the wrong message to disabled 
individuals about their relationship to the labor force. However, those reforms (or any reform for 
that matter) should not be implemented without a careful analysis, which in this case requires a 
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quasi-experimental approach using the sophisticated tools of inter-temporal optimization under 
uncertainty. 
 
Making every effort to give all members of our society the chance to become an economically 
productive individual seems hardly a tough sell, to policy makers and the society as a whole, in 
our advanced and fairly progressive democratic systems. The implementability of the provision 
of the conditions that would maximize the probability that disabled individuals would consider 
joining the labor force is a tougher problem that requires our attention and effort. A society 
should be judged by the way it treats and provides for those who have had to deal with the most 
difficult situations, but also by whether it allows them to contribute productively to the economy 
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